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Abstract
Unemployment in the United Kingdom has fallen from high European-style levels to US
levels. I argue that the key reasons are the reform of monetary policy, in 1993 with the
adoption of inflation targeting and in 1997 with the establishment of the independent
Monetary Policy Committee, and second the decline of trade union power. I interpret the
reform of monetary policy as an institutional change that reduced inflationary pressures in the
face of falling unemployment. The decline of trade union power contributed to the control of
wage inflation. The major continental economies failed to match UK performance because of
institutional rigidities, despite low inflation expectations.
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1. Introduction 
Unemployment in the United Kingdom is one of the European success stories. Starting 
in 1993, when it stood at 10.3 per cent of the labour force, it came down to 5.1 per cent in 
2002. The beneficiary was employment. The percentage of the working-age population 
employed since 1993 has risen in every year, from 70.4 per cent in 1993 to 74.7 per cent in 
2001. The labour force changed very little, from 78.5 percent of the working age population 
in 1993 to 78.7 percent in 2001. Moreover, both sexes and all ages participated in this 
employment gain. This paper documents this success story and discusses the reasons behind 
it. 
Section 2 reviews the evidence and shows how the big swings of the 1980s gave way 
to a long expansion of employment in the 1990s. What appeared like a permanent rise in 
unemployment in the first half of the 1980s was reversed in the second half of the 1990s. 
Section 3 discusses the British Beveridge curve, with a view to establishing shifts in the curve 
which may indicate a structural break. We argue, perhaps unconventionally, that there is only 
one convincing structural shift, in the second half of the 1970s. The long swings of the 1980s, 
which appear like long-term shifts, can, in fact, be attributed to cyclical shifts. Section 4 does 
the same for the Phillips curve and discovers the clue to the British success story. Whereas in 
the past a prolonged fall in unemployment led to inflationary pressures and contraction, in the 
1990s inflation did not materialise. The economy’s expansion was not halted by 
contractionary policy because the inflation constraint did not bind. We argue that the key to 
this change is the combination of the decline of trade unions and the credible reform of the 
monetary policy regime, taking place first in 1993, when the exchange rate target was 
abandoned in favour of an inflation target, and strengthened in 1997, when the Bank of 
England was given operational independence. 
In section 5 I review the institutional structure of the UK labour market. I argue that 
the reforms to the unemployment insurance system are unlikely to have contributed much to 
the fall in unemployment. But the decline of trade union power almost certainly did, in 
combination with the change in the monetary policy regime. Trade union power reached its 
peak in Britain in the late 1970s and its trough in the 1990s (for reasons that we do not yet 
fully understand). The fact that unions did not have the power to push for wage rises when 
unemployment was falling in the 1990s reinforced the low-inflation credentials of the 
monetary policy regime, and helped sustain the fall of unemployment.   3
Section 6 changes theme and reports growth accounting results to show whether the 
expansion of employment associated with the fall in unemployment was autonomously 
induced by institutional change or caused by exogenous output shocks. If unemployment falls 
because of institutional change TFP progress and labour productivity should be less important 
and employment a more important cause of output growth. If, on the other hand, the reason 
for the employment fall is an exogenous output shock TFP should be the main driving force 
of the output growth. I show that in the two big employment expansions, in the late 1980s and 
in the period since 1993, employment played a bigger role in output growth than in other 
periods. But although the evidence points to a slightly more important role for employment in 
the more recent period, it is on the whole unconvincing. 
Britain has always been a liberal economy when compared with continental Europe. 
Employment protection legislation has never been very strong and product market regulation, 
in the form of start-up costs for new businesses, or business taxation, have been weak (except 
for a large public sector, which was privatised in the 1980s). So two questions need to be 
answered to establish our claim that the reform of the monetary policy regime was behind the 
British success story. First, why was unemployment so low up to the mid 1970s, well before 
the monetary policy reforms? And second, why did continental Europe, with even stronger 
anti-inflationary credentials than Britain, not experience a similar success story? 
The answer to the first question lies in the nature of the shocks that have hit the British 
economy. In the period before 1974 the shocks that drove output growth were almost entirely 
productivity shocks and there was hardly any employment growth. When productivity growth 
slowed down in the 1970s inflation became a constraint to maintaining high employment. The 
answer to the second question lies in the institutional structure of the labour market. The 
continental European countries with the anti-inflation credentials have restrictive labour 
market institutions, which Britain does not have. With the exception of trade union power, 
where Britain was firmly in the European arena until the second half of the 1980s, British 
institutions have always been closer to US institutions than to continental European ones. The 
constraint that stopped Britain short of achieving US-style success in the 1970s and 1980s is 
the inflationary pressure that each fall in unemployment caused. Once trade unions lost their 
power and the Bank of England established its anti-inflation credentials the inflation 
constraint eased and the British labour market took the transition path from continental 
Europe to the United States.   4
2. Unemployment trends 
Figure 1 shows the recorded rate of unemployment in Great Britain since 1970 and a 
rate that is smoothed for short-term fluctuations. Most of the rise in unemployment from the 
low values of 2 to 3 per cent before 1973 to nearly 12 per cent in 1986 is clearly due to a rise 
in the smoothed rate. Commentators have concluded from this that the rise in UK 
unemployment is a rise in the “natural rate,” namely, in the underlying unemployment rate 
that cannot be reduced by expansionary aggregate demand management.
1 Equally, the fall in 
unemployment since then, to about 5 per cent of the workforce, is a fall in the natural rate. 
Currently, aggregate demand policy is neither expansionary nor contractionary, something 
confirmed by the stability of inflation over the last few years. The deviation between the 
smoothed and actual rate has been rather modest compared with the underlying change in the 
smoothed rate, reaching 2 per cent in the recession of the early to mid 1980s and (negative) 3 
per cent for a brief period following the policy-driven expansion of the late 1980s.  
The question whether the smoothed rate shown in figure 1 is the natural rate and the 
deviation between the smoothed rate and the actual rate is the cyclical component is open to 
question. One thing that we can say is that the deviation between the two rates shown in 
figure 1 is not the only component of cyclical unemployment. Cyclical shocks can be real and 
the natural rate as conventionally defined is a cyclical variable. It is certainly true to say, 
however, that changes in unemployment due to unanticipated monetary policy are not 
interesting in the British context. 
The series shown in figure 1, which is based on the labour-force based ILO definition 
of unemployment, rises fast between 1979 and 1983 and then falls fast again after 1986. This 
is a feature of other definitions of unemployment in the 1980s, but whether the peak year is 
1983, 84 or 86 varies according to definition. The underlying feature of unemployment in the 
1980s (the “stylised fact”) is a fast rise in 1979-83, a plateau in 1983-86, and a fast decline in 
1986-90. The plateau took place at a time when the economy and labour productivity were 
growing fast, and it is the feature that gave rise to the “hysteresis” view of unemployment. 
Namely, why did the rise in the actual rate of unemployment persist well into the recovery?
2  
In order to shed more light into what was really happening to unemployment during 
this period we turn to employment data. The employment series shown in figure 2 shows a 
                                                 
1 This goes back at least to Bruno and Sachs (1985). The work of Layard and Nickell (see e.g. Layard et 
al., 1991, Nickell, 1997, and Layard and Nickell, 1999), Phelps (1994), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), as well as 
mine (Pissarides, 1986, 1999) also reaches similar conclusions. 
2 See, for example, Blanchard and Summers (1986), Layard et al. (1991) and Pissarides (1992).   5
fast decline between 1979 and 1983, and then a fast recovery between 1983 and 1989; i.e., 
there is no plateau. Naturally, this is reflected in the labour force series. Adding together the 
employment and unemployment series gives the participation rate shown in figure 2. 
Participation rises between 1965 and 1980, falls sharply between 1980 and 1983 and rises 
again between 1983 and 1986. The “hysteresis” years of 1983-86 appear to be years of rising 
employment but not falling unemployment. In figure 3 I correct for the temporary changes in 
the participation rate, which is a reflection of “discouraged” workers who were obviously 
prepared to come back into employment when the opportunities presented themselves. The 
participation rate was put through an HP filter and the difference between the filtered 
participation series and the actual employment series plotted against the recorded 
unemployment series. The two series track each other very closely, except for the period 
1983-86. The plateau disappears and unemployment shows a steep cycle that peaks in 1983, 
and starts falling as the economy begins its recovery in that year. It would appear that on this 
interpretation, the “mystery” that taxed the minds of labour economists at the time – why is 
unemployment apparently immune to what is happening elsewhere in the economy – is a 
peculiarity of the statistical definition of unemployment. Namely, the fact the it ignores 
discouraged workers who are available to take up work but are not searching when the 
number of vacancies is very low. 
Figure 4 shows the unemployment rates of women and three age groups, 15 to 24 
(youths), 25-54 (prime age) and 55-65 (older), in relation to the overall male unemployment 
rate. The female unemployment rate has been consistently below the male rate and is less 
cyclical, largely because more women relative to men work in the less cyclical service 
industries. But there have not been major changes in relative unemployment rates, especially 
since the recovery of the 1990s. The only rather unremarkable change is a small increase in 
the youth unemployment rate, from about 110 per cent of the male rate in 1993 to about 124 
per cent in 1999. All age groups and both sexes benefited from the employment gains of the 
1990s. 
The duration of unemployment in the recent expansion has been relatively unaffected 
until 1997, when the ratio of long term unemployment (over 52 weeks) to the total declined 
sharply, and the ratio of under 26 weeks increased sharply (figure 5). This is consistent with 
the view that in expansion the main vehicle for changes in the long-term unemployment rate 
is the inflow from short-term unemployment and not the outflow. Namely, when the 
expansion started the long-term unemployed did not initially benefit more from it than the   6
short term unemployed did, but their numbers declined because as more of the short-term 
unemployed found jobs fewer entered long-term unemployment. 
The number of jobs created have mostly been full-time regular jobs. Figures 6 and 7 
show the proportion of part-time and temporary jobs for men and women separately. The 
proportion of temporary jobs grew slightly for both sexes in the 1990s, but only by about 1 
percentage point in total. Temporary jobs are below 8 per cent for both sexes and not an 
important ingredient of British labour markets, perhaps because employers do not have much 
difficulty hiring and firing employees as needs arise. 
Part-time jobs, however, are a different proposition altogether, especially for women. 
Part-time jobs are an important element in the female labour market, accounting for about 45 
per cent of total employment. Perhaps surprisingly, this proportion has been fairly constant 
during the recent cycles in employment. Survey evidence shows that far from employers 
using part-time jobs for women to smooth fluctuations, or to get around labour restrictions, 
they are jobs which are in demand by women and used by employers in their normal 
operations
3 
Part-time jobs for men account for a much smaller fraction of employment but this 
fraction has grown by some three percentage points during the recent employment expansion. 
The fastest growth, however, took place during the employment contraction of 1989-93, and it 
continued in the subsequent expansion, especially in 1993-97. This goes against any argument 
that the fall in male unemployment after 1993 is due to the expansion of part-time jobs. More 
work is needed on the role of part-time jobs in the male labour force, as more Labour Force 
Survey data become available and part-time jobs are acquiring an increasing role in it.
4 
3. The UK Beveridge Curve 
Beveridge curves have become important tools for identifying the causes of changes in 
unemployment. Their interpretation, however, is still open to question. Recent theoretical 
advances show that both the cycle and structural changes can shift the Beveridge curve, 
although the shift due to the business cycle should reverse when the cyclical turn reverses. 
The position of the Beveridge curve depends on the rate of job destruction in the economy 
(the ratio of jobs destroyed to the stock of employment), the incentives that unemployed 
                                                 
3  Evidence on job satisfaction can be found in the European Household Panel. See Petrongolo (2003) 
for some preliminary results. The “women’s” literature dismisses part-time jobs as secondary, but without 
evidence beyond some anecdotes. See e.g. Franks (1999, p. 79-86). 
4 For example, there has been a large rise in the number of full-time students holding part-time jobs, 
which needs more research.   7
workers have to look for a job and on mismatch. The Beveridge curve should be further away 
from the origin in recession than in recovery. One reason for this claim is the higher job 
destruction that takes place in recession. Another is connected with the search disincentives 
that workers have in recession. Search disincentives are likely to be higher in recession partly 
because non-market returns, including the real level of unemployment benefits, are likely to 
be less cyclical than market returns, and partly because during recession the average duration 
of unemployment lengthens and discouragement builds up. The traditional classification of 
shocks as cyclical when they cause a movement along the curve and structural when they shift 
the curve is valid, but empirically it is not easy to distinguish between short-term shifts and 
long-term shifts. Generally speaking, a shift in the Beveridge curve that does not reverse 
when the cycle returns to the point where the curve started its shift is classified as a structural 
shift. One that reverses is a cyclical one. 
The UK Beveridge curve, shown in figure 8, is consequently open to more than one 
interpretation. My interpretation of some of the observations on this curve is unconventional. 
A “textbook” interpretation is provided by the experience of the 1970s. In 1974 vacancies 
were falling sharply but because unemployment was rising, the 1975 observation should be to 
the left of the 1972 one. This is not the case in figure 8 and this is evidence of a small shift. 
But if instead of actual unemployment we use the corrected unemployment series of figure 3 
this shift disappears. A much more pronounced shift in the curve took place between 1975 
and 1978. The key to a structural shift lies in the fact that when vacancies recovered in 1978 
and 1979, they recovered at some 2 percentage points of unemployment above the level that 
the observations from the early 1970s would lead one to expect. Between 1970 and 1981 there 
are two Beveridge curves in the UK, each broadly associated with a growth cycle. The shifts 
at this time were probably due to the sharp realignment of relative input prices that took place 
in 1974-5 and the mismatches that it created in the labour market.  
An apparently uncontroversial interpretation of what happens next is that between 
1981 and 1983 the curve shifted out, because of its north-eastern movement. But my 
interpretation is that this shift is temporary, and is associated with an unusually long cycle. 
The outward shift in the early 1980s was due to two events, the big structural change that took 
place in the British economy in the early 1980s, with the associated fast decline of 
manufacturing, and the built up of long-term unemployment, which followed the unusually 
deep the recession in 1981. Both these events eventually corrected themselves, in the recovery 
phase of the cycle. The rate of growth of GDP increased in the UK in every year between 
1980 and 1988 (except for 1984), the rate in 1988 being the highest observed since 1973.   8
Growth was still positive in 1990. The deep recession of 1981 was succeeded by the long 
recovery of 1981-90. Because the recession in the early 1980s was so deep, the shift in the 
curve associated with the cycle was bigger than in previous cycles. The return path was also 
longer and slower than previously. The built-up of long-term unemployment and the 
discouragement that it precipitated are key to this interpretation. The observations from 1980 
to 1989 trace an unusually large anti-clockwise loop, with 1983-86 the deepest points of the 
recession in the labour market. 
The increase in long-term unemployment in the 1980s led to the introduction of active 
labour market policies. ALMPs shift the Beveridge curve towards the origin and Britain had 
some moderate success with these, especially with the restart programme for the long-term 
unemployed (see Jackman et al, 1990, OECD, 1993). At best, however, these programmes 
accelerated the self-correcting mechanism that took place during recovery. It is doubtful 
whether the active labour market policy measures of the late 1980s had a permanent effect on 
the position of the Beveridge curve. 
1989 appears to be a turning point in the labour market. Growth was at 2 per cent, 
unemployment down to 6 per cent and vacancies high. In 1990 growth and vacancies fell 
sharply but unemployment continued for a while its downward path. A doubt that may be 
raised about the cyclical interpretation of the shift in the 1980s is the question, why did 
unemployment not fall more before recession came in 1990? The recession of the early 1990s, 
however, was policy-induced. Monetary policy in Britain changed at this time, first 
shadowing the deutchemark and then entering the ERM, and its inflation rate of 7.5 per cent 
was unsustainable (the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed “surprise” by how quickly 
inflationary pressures followed his expansion of 1986-7). In 1990 the economy was subjected 
to a large deflationary monetary shock which lacked credibility (see below for more on this) 
and unemployment increased. 
The question for the Beveridge curve is whether the fact that the 1989-93 increase in 
unemployment is to the right of the 1979-81 increase is evidence of more mismatch in the 
labour market in the 1990s than in the early 1980s. There can be no clear answer to this 
question but my interpretation of it is that it is not. The Phillips curve discussion in the next 
section gives more support. Inflation was much higher in the early 1980s but in the early 
1990s external pressures forced a contractionary aggregate policy which stopped the economy 
short of returning to its 1979-80 position. 
The loop traced from 1989 to 1997 is another textbook Beveridge curve. But once in 
the low unemployment equilibrium of 1997, no contraction took place, despite a small fall in   9
the GDP growth rate. Unemployment continued to fall, and by 2000-01 it reached its late 
1970s position. Is this evidence of an inward shift or is it a return to the steady-state position 
of the late 1970s, after the long recession and recovery of the 1980s and 1990s? There is 
evidence to support both lines of reasoning. From 1994 onwards growth was steady or falling, 
vacancies were steady, inflation was steady and yet unemployment was falling. Viewed in 
this light, this is clear evidence that something happened in the labour market which improved 
the natural rate. One can look for institutional reform in the labour market but these were also 
years of fundamental reforms to monetary policy, which did not allow inflationary pressures 
to build up. We claim that the monetary policy regime can be important in labour markets 
beyond the short run, and argue that the dynamics of the natural rate observed in the 1990s 
can be attributed to the reform of monetary policy. This introduces an old fashioned, yet 
currently neglected “institution” in the dynamics of unemployment, monetary policy, but it 
introduces it as an influence on the NAIRU, not on the short-run deviation between the 
NAIRU and actual unemployment. To see the importance of this we turn to the Phillips curve. 
4. The UK Phillips Curve 
Before the advent of supply shocks and the Lucas critique of the Phillips curve, the 
dynamics of unemployment in the UK were described in terms of the “stop-go” cycle. The 
Phillips curve played a key role in this description. Starting from recession, the economy was 
given the “go,” to bring unemployment down. But after a brief fall, inflation picked up. The 
“brakes” were applied, to bring it under control. Both expansionary and contractionary 
policies were real – fiscal policy, the regulation of hire-purchase
5 - although interest rate 
policy was also used as an anti-cyclical tool. 
In modern language the stop-go cycle describes the interplay between a “shock,” real 
aggregate policy, and an “institution,” the monetary policy regime. The monetary policy 
regime determines expectations, and expectations determine the point at which inflation sets 
in to check a further decline in unemployment. Inflation is a constraint on low unemployment, 
and because inflation differentials across the world cannot be large for long periods, countries 
with more inflationary bias in their monetary policy regime have to operate at a higher level 
of average unemployment than countries with lower inflationary bias. A close look at the UK 
Phillips curve tells this story. It is shown in figure 9 for the years 1970-2001. The Phillips 
                                                 
5 Before the widespread use of credit cards, most durables were financed by hire-purchase, essentially a 
loan arranged by the seller of the durable and repaid in instalments. Policy controlled the minimum down-
payment, namely, the cash amount that the seller had to put up initially, and used this down-payment as a means 
of cyclical control of the economy.   10
curve with corrected unemployment tells a similar story, except the recovery of 1986 shown 
in figure 9 starts in 1983. 
In 1973-75 the supply shocks hit and moved the economy in a north-eastern direction, 
increasing both inflation and unemployment. There have been three cycles in the UK since 
1975 and each one traced a path in inflation-unemployment space that was increasingly flatter 
and closer to the horizontal unemployment axis than the previous one. From 1975 to 1986 (or 
to 1983 with corrected unemployment) the path traced by the economy is a textbook example 
of a short-run Phillips curve, with a minor exception in 1979-80, when another oil shock 
moved the economy north-eastwards. The predominant move from 1975 to 1986 is one of a 
fall in demand and a move down, along a fairly steep curve. Inflation fell from 26 to nearly 3 
per cent but unemployment rose from 3 to 12 per cent. The period 1986 to 1993 traces another 
textbook Phillips cycle, but now along a flatter curve. The trade-off improves. Unemployment 
went down from 12 to 6 per cent but inflation increased only from 3.3 to 7.5 per cent. Then, 
in 1993, unemployment falls again, and the fall continues to the end of the sample, along an 
even flatter Phillips curve. Unemployment fell from 10.5 to 5 per cent with hardly any move 
in inflation. 
Thus, excluding the oils shocks, we can trace three “Phillips curves” in the UK, with 
increasing flatness. The less favourable curve of the 1975-86 period, the flatter and more 
favourable trade-off of the 1986-93 period and the most favourable trade off, the post-1993 
period. A natural interpretation of this downward shift of the Phillips curve is in terms of 
inflation expectations. In the late 1970s inflation became so entrenched that a fall in demand – 
justified by “monetarism,” which, despite popular belief, started in 1976 with the visit of the 
IMF and not with Thatcher – caused a lot of unemployment before inflation could be brought 
down. By 1986 the recession and the monetarist policy followed by the government finally 
brought inflation expectations down. The monetary policy regime changed at this time, to one 
of less inflation bias under German monetary influence. The exchange rate became the new 
target of policy, shadowing the deutchemark, first from outside and then from inside the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). When the government expanded the economy 
again in 1987, with an election imminent, unemployment fell along a flatter Phillips curve, 
but inflation increased to a level that was still inconsistent with the new target. 
Late in 1992 Britain exited the ERM and the Bank of England introduced inflation 
targeting. Although independence was not granted to the Bank until 1997, when inflation 
expectations fell dramatically, the exit from the ERM and introduction of inflation targeting 
did not increase expectations except perhaps slightly at first, which may explain the move of   11
inflation from 1.4 in 1994 to 3.3 in 1996. But inflation targeting soon brought inflation 
expectations down and the granting of independence to the Bank in 1997, with low inflation 
as the only objective, made the short-run Phillips curve essentially flat.
6 The monetary policy 
regime became an “employment-friendly” institution. The growth of the second half of the 
1990s did not hit the inflation constraint but allowed unemployment to fall to the levels of the 
high inflation era of the late 1970s. 
Is it reasonable to attribute so much sluggishness to inflation expectations as is 
apparent in the 1970s and 1980s? If we think of inflation expectations in the way that 
economists used to think of them when they were estimating Phillips curves, as either 
adaptive or rational, the plausible answer is no, it is unlikely that inflation expectations take 
long to adjust to events. But if we rethink the issue in terms of the credibility of monetary 
policy the answer changes. In the 1970s and early 80s the public could not believe that the 
inflation bias in British monetary and fiscal policy was taken out of the system. The Treasury 
refused to change the institutional rules of monetary policy and monetary policy was 
discretionary and completely under Treasury control. The Thatcher disinflation lacked 
credibility. It took a massive recession and a large increase in unemployment to bring 
inflation down and it took four years to do it. 
In 1987, when the expansion was obviously politically-motivated and the operational 
ways of the Bank of England did not change, inflation fears built up, as unemployment fell. 
But the fear of a complete return to the high inflation era of the late 1970s was averted, partly 
because by this time the government established better anti-inflation credentials and partly 
because of the switch to the exchange rate target. But the fears were enough to push prices up 
to unsustainable levels, albeit it much below the inflation levels of a decade earlier. In 1990 
another policy-induced recession aimed at the high inflation led to an increase in 
unemployment. 
But in 1993 the change in the target was an important operational change and in 1997 
it virtually acquired the force of law, with the establishment of the independent Monetary 
Policy Committee. The economy could then be allowed to expand and bring unemployment 
down beyond the levels of the late 1980s, because inflation was removed as an obstacle to the 
expansion. Looking at the Beveridge diagram in figure 8 it is apparent that the critical era 
began in 1997, when the economy returned to where it was in 1989. But whereas in 1989 
                                                 
6 See Johnson (2002) and references therein for the negative influence of inflation targeting on inflation 
expectations in Britain and elsewhere. Nelson and Nikolov (2002) show that if monetary policy after the 1973 
shocks was run on the same principles as after 1992 the high inflation of the mid 1970s would have been 
avoided.   12
inflation rose to 7.5 per cent and the policy brakes had to be applied, in 1997 inflation was 
still on target, below 3 per cent, and expansion could be allowed to continue.  
5. Labour market institutions 
Are there any other institutional changes that can explain the fall in the UK natural 
unemployment rate? 
Panel regressions for the OECD show that the important labour-market institutions 
that influence unemployment are the unemployment insurance system and unionisation.
7 
Employment protection legislation is also sometimes found to be restricting employment 
growth, but the results are not robust and usually (as suggested by theory) employment 
protection’s influence on unemployment is ambiguous.
8 More recently, product market 
regulation has been found to be at least as important as labour market regulation in its 
influence on unemployment,
9 whereas general taxation, in the form of the tax wedge between 
labour costs and take-home pay, has failed to show up significantly in unemployment 
regressions.
 10 
Product market regulation includes entry costs for new enterprises, taxation of 
entrepreneurial activity, state control of industry and regulation of domestic and international 
trade. The United Kingdom has always been one of the least regulated countries in Europe 
across the board. The OECD published a comprehensive ranking of 20 economies in 1997 in 
terms of their performance along a number of dimensions of product market regulation (see 
Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud, 2000). The United Kingdom came top, beating even the 
United States. Of the major European economies Germany was 8
th, France was 18
th and Italy 
20
th. Unfortunately there is no time series information on product market regulation to draw 
on, but with the exception of the privatisation programme of the 1980s, which reduced the 
UK government’s state control of industry, there is no obvious reason to believe that the 
relative ranking of the UK has changed in this respect. It is also unlikely that the privatisation 
                                                 
7 See, among others, Scarpetta (1996), Nickell (1997), Nickell et al (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000). 
8 Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) find it to be significant but they are the exception rather than the rule. 
See OECD (1999), Bertola (1999) and Pissarides (2001) for more discussion. 
9 See Nicoletti et al (2000), Fonseca et al (2000), Pissarides (2003) and Lopez-Garcia (2003) for some 
OECD results and Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) for a more detailed study of the French retail sector. 
10 Another possible candidate for the fall in the natural rate after 1997 is active labour market policy in 
the form of the New Deal program for the unemployed, which was introduced by the new Labour Government in 
1998. The program covered only young people aged 18-24, who had been unemployed for six months. Although 
its impact on the treatment group was large (Blundell et al, 2002, estimate that on average it increased the 
transition from unemployment to employment by about five percentage points, or 20 per cent, in the first four 
months of treatment), the treatment group was too small and the program too recent to have had an impact on 
aggregate unemployment dynamics.   13
programme led to a big reduction in unemployment, although it may have contributed to the 
decline of unions and the moderation of wage demands. 
The tax wedge grew in Britain between 1974 and 1981 but declined virtually 
monotonically since then (figure 10). But although the timing is approximately right for the 
underlying changes in unemployment, it is unlikely to be a major contributor to the fall of 
unemployment in the 1990s. First, the fall in taxes from 1987 to 1990 was at about the same 
order of magnitude as the fall between 1982 and 1985, and in the 1982-85 period 
unemployment experienced its biggest rise. Second, the fall in the 1990s was of a much 
smaller order of magnitude than in earlier periods. And finally, panel regressions of 
unemployment do not find a significant influence from the tax wedge on unemployment.
11 
We turn now to a discussion of the two labour market institutions that usually are 
found to be significant in panel regressions, unemployment insurance and unionisation. Two 
parameters are usually used to capture the influence of the unemployment insurance system, 
the ratio of compensation to the mean wage and the duration of entitlement. However, since 
the most frequently used measure of duration is the percentage of benefit that an unemployed 
worker retains after one year of claiming, this is equivalent to using two replacement ratio 
measures, one that applies to the typical unemployed person with less that 52 weeks 
unemployment and one applying to those with more than 52 weeks. The two series for the UK 
are shown in figure 11. 
The replacement ratios shown in figure 11 do not tell a very convincing story. In the 
1970s replacement ratios fell and then rose again but no major changes took place. Then, 
beginning in 1980, the replacement ratio for the short-term unemployed declined fast, from its 
1980 value of 33 per cent to 26 per cent in 1982 and to 21.5 per cent in 1988. The ratio for the 
long-term unemployed also declined, but the decline started later and it was smaller, from 
nearly 20 per cent in 1982 to 15 per cent in 1990. 
Since unemployment was rising fast in the UK up to 1984, the time of the biggest fall 
in the replacement ratio, unemployment insurance policy cannot explain the rise in 
unemployment. In 1983 the recovery started and unemployment benefits were falling. But 
unemployment fell fast yet replacement ratios after the mid 1980s declined very little. It 
would require a very large elasticity to explain the fall in unemployment, if UI is to be the 
driving force. Elasticities estimated in micro studies are usually small. The fall in the 
                                                 
11 Taxes should influence unemployment, if at all, only when they are distortionary, e.g., when they are 
progressive or when they distort incentives during job search through the differential taxation of unemployment 
benefits. Non-distortionary taxes should be absorbed by wages without effect on unemployment, given the long-
run tendency of the supply of labour not to respond to changes such as the secular growth in productivity.   14
replacement ratio from the mid 1980s may have contributed to the decline in unemployment, 
but it could not have been the cause. 
Unemployment insurance may, however, have played a role through other channels, 
which may have come into play in the UK in the second half of the 1980s. One is the built-up 
of long-term unemployment and another is trade unionism. 
The built up of long-term unemployment in the UK was blamed for the persistence of 
unemployment in the mid 1980s. Without generous and long-lasting unemployment benefits, 
the argument goes, long-term unemployment would not have built up and unemployment 
would not have persisted. The United States is again used as an example of a country with 
limited duration benefits that has no long-term unemployment. Empirical evidence is not very 
convincing but those who looked at it became convinced that the duration of benefits is 
critical in the built up of long-term unemployment.
12 The claim that long-term unemployment 
causes persistence is also probably justified, although this requires duration-dependence in 
exit probabilities, which has not been established beyond doubt in micro studies. It might 
therefore be argued that the reforms to unemployment insurance at the end of the 1980s, 
including the fall in the level of benefits and the introduction of active policies targeted to the 
long-term unemployed, helped to contain the rise in long-term unemployment in the recession 
of 1990-93. Figure 5 shows that long-term unemployment was falling throughout the 1990s. 
The second institution that is found to be important in empirical studies is 
unionisation. Unionisation expanded in the 1970s and reached its peak in the late 1970s 
(figure 12). Beginning in 1979 union power declined and in the 1990s unions became 
ineffective. Legislation that curtailed union power was passed in the early 1980s, with the 
most important measure probably being the 1986 legislation, which prohibited the closed 
shop.
13 There has been a long debate whether the legislation was responsible for the decline of 
unions in the UK, in light of the fact that unions declined also in other large European 
countries which did not pass anti-union legislation. Checchi and Lucifora (2002), who looked 
at union density in a large number of countries, concluded that the decline of public sector 
employment in the UK and the Thatcher government’s anti-union legislation contributed to 
the decline of unions. But in their summary evaluation the United Kingdom appears to be 
exactly at the median of the sample. The absence of state insurance provision (generosity of 
unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, wage indexation clauses) predicts 
                                                 
12 Layard et al. (2001), Pissarides (1999). 
13 See Booth (1995).   15
that the UK should have about 6 percentage points more coverage than the mean but a large 
country fixed effect predicts that it should have 6 percentage points less than the mean. 
Has the decline of trade unions been important in the fall in unemployment in the late 
1990s? The empirical research of Nickell et al (1999) and others appears to make this the 
most important factor in the fall of unemployment. The decline of unions alone, however, is 
not enough to explain the job creation of the 1990s. We argued that what was different in the 
1990s expansion was that inflation did not rise to provoke a reaction from the government. 
We credited this to changes in the monetary environment. The fact that unions were weak in 
the 1990s, however, also contributes to the low-inflation environment. Unions in the 1970s 
and early 1980s put in large claims when unemployment was falling. In the 1990s they did 
not. Whether they did not because they expected the Bank of England to keep inflation low, 
or whether they did not because they did not have the power to do it is a moot point. Given 
empirical results by others, however, some of the employment gains in the 90s must be due to 
the inability of unions to appropriate the gains from the expansion of labour demand for their 
employed members. 
6. Identifying the causes of employment growth 
There have been three periods of cyclical GDP growth in the United Kingdom since 
the mid 1970s, roughly in 1976-79, 1982-89 and 1993-2001. In each unemployment fell, but 
in the first expansion the employment rate did not rise. In the other two it rose very rapidly. 
Another feature of each expansion is more interesting. In the first two expansions labour 
productivity grew above trend. In the last it grew below trend, with the exception of two 
years, 1994 and 1995. If instead of labour productivity we look at TFP the difference is even 
more striking. TFP grew above trend in the first two expansions and below trend in each and 
every year since 1993. This information is useful for the following reason. If unemployment 
falls because of new job creation that is caused by an external shock to output, we should 
expect labour productivity to rise above trend. The external shock raises labour productivity, 
increases the demand for labour and leads to more job creation. But if employment is growing 
because of some institutional reform that increases the demand for labour, employment 
becomes the driving force of output growth and so productivity should be rising below trend. 
The behaviour of labour productivity appears to suggest that the 1990s expansion was 
different from the previous ones, and driven by institutional reform. But there are more 
convincing ways of applying this taxonomy. Growth accounting exercises decompose the 
growth in output into one of three reasons, employment growth, capital growth or TFP. If   16
institutional reform is important in driving employment growth the contribution of 
employment to output growth should be above historical levels. Figure 13 shows precisely 
this indicator. It is the difference between the contribution to output growth of the combined 
TFP growth and capital accumulation on the one hand and employment on the other. The 
variable shown is very cyclical, rising in periods of output expansion and falling in recession. 
But in the growth years of the 1980s the difference is large, indicating relatively more 
important productivity growth. With the exception of one year, 1984, the contribution of 
capital and TFP growth to output growth is more important in the 80s expansion than in the 
expansion of the late 1990s. 
This is confirmed by Table 1, which shows the average contribution of each factor to 
output growth for selected periods since 1960. On average employment growth contributed 
9.6 per cent to output growth. In the expansion of the 1960s the contribution of employment 
was smaller and it was negative in the contraction of the 1970s. But it increased to 17.1 per 
cent in the expansion of the 1980s and to 19.6 per cent in the expansion of the 1990s. Thus, in 
the more recent cycles firms relied more on job creation than on investment and new 
technology vehicles for output growth. They could do this because of institutional changes 
that reduced their expectations of wage growth: the decline of union power and the anti-
inflation credentials of the new monetary policy regime are again key to this. 
 
Table 1 
Growth accounting for the United Kingdom 
Per cent contributions 
 
Period GDP  growth  Employment  Capital  TFP 
1960-2001 2.5  9.6  49.9  40.5 
1960-1973 3.3  7.5  55.3  37.2 
1974-1983 1.1  -34.2 79.7  54.5 
1983-1992 2.5  17.1  39.1  43.8 
1993-2001 3.0  19.6  33.1  47.2 
 
But not much should be made of this because there are only two cyclical upswings, 
and they exhibit very similar behaviour in the growth accounting sense. And the most 
important influence on output is still, by far, productivity growth. The biggest contrast to   17
emerge from the growth accounting exercises is between the period before the mid 1980s and 
the period after. This will prove useful in another context, to which we now turn. 
7. Possible objections 
Our claim that the key to the British success story is the combination of monetary 
policy reform and the decline of trade union power needs to deal with two objections. First, it 
has to explain why unemployment in European countries that have had credible low-inflation 
institutions since the 1960s did not have the same unemployment history as Britain did. 
Germany is a case in point. Unemployment in Germany is now amongst the highest in 
Europe. Second, Britain had the inflation bias before 1974 but unemployment did not take off. 
Why? 
The answer to the first question is to be found in other labour market institutions. 
Institutions such as high minimum wages, generous unemployment insurance and stringent 
product market regulation can cause high unemployment whatever the monetary policy 
regime. British institutions, especially since the mid 1980s, have been closer to those of the 
United States than to those of Europe. Britain did not have minimum wages to speak of, 
always ranked low on product market regulation and the level of its unemployment benefits 
has been below other European countries’ levels. Yet, Britain’s unemployment history until 
the early 1990s has been the history of Europe. The reason is the British economy’s inability 
to come out of the 1970s supply shocks with low inflation at prevailing unemployment rates. 
Union demands in the 1970s and early 1980s were aggressive and created industrial strife, 
with which the government was unable to deal without causing a big rise in unemployment. It 
was also unable to deal with the price rises caused by the supply shocks with the prevailing 
monetary policy regime. Other European countries could deal with inflation more effectively 
but their labour markets were not flexible enough to adapt quickly to the new conditions 
without causing high unemployment. By the early 1990s unions lost their power to push for 
big wage rises in the face of falling unemployment and monetary policy was addressed 
specifically to inflation. The history of unemployment and inflation in Britain since then has 
had more features in common with the history of unemployment and inflation in the United 
States than with their history in continental Europe. 
The answer to the second question, why was unemployment low in the 1960s, has to 
be found in the type of shocks that hit the British economy. The problems that surfaced in the 
1970s and 1980s were present in 1960s Britain, but were overshadowed by a buoyant 
economy, protected from foreign competition and growing fast to reconstruct after the war.   18
The shocks that hit Britain in the 1960s and up to 1973 were positive productivity shocks. In 
Table 1, the period up to 1963 is one of growth but of very small contribution from 
employment and a large contribution from TFP progress and investment. The employment 
rate in 1971-72 was at the same level as it was in 1965-66 (see figure 2). Between 1962 and 
1973 the GDP growth rate exceeded 2 per cent in each and every year, and the rate of growth 
of labour productivity was rising faster than trend from one year to the next. The economy 
was operating at full employment, but despite the buoyant conditions employment was not 
growing. When the negative supply shocks hit in the mid 1970s and the rate of growth of 
productivity declined, neither the full employment nor the previous rate of increase of real 
wages could be sustained at low inflation rates. Unions became more aggressive in their 
demands and the Bank of England accommodated wage demands and public deficits. It was 
realised that the policy was unsustainable as early as 1976, but the strong disinflation and 
waning of union influence did not take place until after the election of a new government in 
1979. 
8. Conclusions 
We argued that the recent history of UK unemployment is a success story, essentially 
because the reforms of monetary policy that took place after 1993, combined with the decline 
of trade union power, removed the inflation constraint from a prolonged expansion in real 
aggregate demand. There is some evidence from growth accounting calculations that they also 
contributed independently to output growth but it is doubtful whether in themselves they have 
been a significant driving force of employment growth. It is more likely that they enabled a 
larger fall in unemployment in the face of rising aggregate demand than that experienced 
under the regimes of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The view that unemployment in Europe has been structural has been so entrenched in 
the minds of economists that monetary factors no longer receive a mention in papers on the 
rise and fall of unemployment. Yet, there is a fundamental difference between monetary 
factors as reflected in temporary deviations between actual and expected prices and monetary 
factors as reflected in the institutional structure of monetary policy. In a world where inflation 
differentials between countries cannot deviate for very long, an institutional structure that has 
the reputation that it accommodates wage demands and large budget deficits can act as a 
constraint on the expansion of economic activity. A change in the credibility of the regime, 
backed by legal reforms, can have a large long-term impact on the real labour market 
outcome.   19
This appears to be the factor behind the recent successes in the United Kingdom. With 
respect to labour-market institutions, Britain has always been at the less interventionist end of 
the European spectrum, resembling in many respects the United States. The reason its 
employment performance failed to mimic employment performance in the United States was 
the combination of strong trade unions and accommodating monetary policy. In the 1980s 
Britain failed because, partly because of ignorance, partly because the Treasury did not want 
to give up its power to control monetary policy, no reforms to the monetary policy regime 
took place and the disinflation lacked credibility. It therefore required a large rise in 
unemployment to bring inflation down. The decline of union power and the reforms to 
monetary policy that took place in 1993 and 1997 allowed unemployment to fall without 
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Data sources 
The main sources are the UK Office of National Statistics (available on line at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/ ) and the OECD. Statistics are generally comparable in the two 
sources. The institutional variables (tax wedge, replacement ratio for short and long-term 
unemployed and union density) are not available at either side and were obtained from 
Nickell et al (2001).  Figure 1
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